ABSTRACT
This reflection is inspired by an article by Ahlberg CMC at the first congress of Pamplona, \u200b\u200bin which the author tends to relativize the concept of hierarchical structure of concept maps, effectively reducing the importance of this criterion.
From an examination of critical concepts of inclusiveness, logical, hierarchical, pyramidal structure or not, you get to demonstrate that the term conceptual map, if defined based purely structural, it is insufficient to describe variety of processes are very different, almost antithetical .
fast translation of the seventh paragraph of the Decalogue Ahlberg
7. Novak and Gowin (1984) and Novak (1998) have argued that the maps should always be hierarchical. This assumption is often unfounded and cheap, but not always. For example, Novak and Gowin (1984, pp 16-18, here 32-34) have shown that the same concepts can be hierarchically arranged in three different ways. The same conclusion could also be achieved if the most important concept in some cases were placed in the center of the concept map, or elsewhere, if the choice is the best option. In this case we can imagine that the center of the map is equivalent to the top of a pyramid viewed from above. It should be remembered that the world is a system, so sometimes the best representation of the world and its subsystems consist conceptual systems are not necessarily hierarchical. Novak and Gowin (1984, pp. 16-18, or 32-34 in the text in Italian) presented three concept maps that illustrate the same concept. They appear to be hierarchical, but there is no way to show that the concept is as high as the largest or most inclusive, as it should be a true pyramid concept, according to Novak and Gowin (1984, p. 33) and Novak (19988, pp. 3, 227). There are also reasons why the ontological and epistemological concept maps may not always be hierarchical. The world is a system, so its better representation is a conceptual system, a concept map, which may not always be hierarchical. Idea similar also emerged from the minds of Safayeni, Derbentseva and Cañas (2003) argued that cyclical arguments on the maps, which are not hierarchical.
At this point I think there is confusion. Ahlberg's argument assumes that Novak appeals to the existence of an absolute criterion of hierarchy that would prove to be non-existent but then in general terms. In fact, I think Novak and Gowin accennino classificatory structures only in general terms to introduce the concept of inclusiveness, but then speak of a principle of inclusiveness lighter, or "inclusiveness subjective" or still, inclusiveness "local".
It is true that the concept of water is by far more inclusive than that of any living being is always just the opposite. But it is true that setting limits on the map page. 32 (16 in the original) 's water is more inclusive of living being, as the author of the map wants to admit that water is necessary to a number of entities, including to living beings . On page. Top 34 in the ' water is clear, however, less inclusive of living beings, being one of the entities contained in them, while in the map low the water is again a concept more inclusive because it described as a substance with locations (living things) and characteristics (ability to change status).
The fact that the hierarchical relationship between water and living things change in the three maps, does not mean that it is always possible, once you choose a certain perspective, reversing the relationship between these concepts (unless you change the context, changing other parts of the map itself). The arbitarietà is not allowed, once you have a context. This is true even in the maps mentioned in Novak and Gowin (1984), where, in the absence of a focus question, there was no well-defined focus and, consequently, occurred fairly arbitrary associations between different domains.
Inclusiveness, hierarchical relationship as required in each set of propositions, is respected, finally, the maps proposed by cyclic Safayeni, Derbentseva and Cañas. An obvious example is the water cycle, where the difference in rank between two concepts is determined by the role of cause - effect that binds them in one direction.
The confusion increases and found that in terms of mental maps we use the word to refer to the hierarchical structure and radial branching of the same, completely independently from the logic of relations. (See eg. Scocco article, "box thinking")
The conclusion is that the pedagogical level, in the context of the map, you can identify with certainty some reversal of the ratio of inclusiveness. These errors will yield preserving remnants of sequential structure of the original text, or because of development of disordered thinking, a reluctance to work riarranggiamenti (binds a concept just recalled, without reflecting on its rank), or the ' inversion may result from a limited capacity perform mental operations of "rotation" of perspective, from a difficulty to change the grammar and syntax or all of these factors added together. For these reasons, the analysis of hierarchical logic a concept map is absolutely essential if you want to use the same map as an assessment tool. The use of concept mapping as a language of direct mediation teacher - student, will also take advantage of dynamic analysis in terms of hierarchical relations, because only in this way you can realize the degree of flexibility in the roles of the concepts within structures under construction.
If we look at the map as a static object, regardless of the generative process, the fact that the binary relations comply with local and non-arbitrary criteria of hierarchy between the concepts in no way implies the emergence of a global pyramid structure . The map may well be both hierarchical and sequential, or cyclic, hybrid, etc.. The pyramid structure can not be identified with the gerarchicità, a feature that adjusts the way nature assigned by individuals to the various parts of the map. The student assigns a different rank to the concepts and can do so in a consistent and gradual, or in a logically inconsistent.
Ahlberg's argument, based on ontological and epistemological reasons, refers constantly to the world as a system that has not always represented as a layered structure map pyramid. It follows that in some cases a map that did not follow this structure could be a "better way" to represent a certain system. But the characteristic of the "best way" seems somewhat vague and, in particular, presupposes that there is a special structure for that system or subsystem that is independent from the perspective of need or at least cognitive of who should represent it. This assumption is not true, therefore, not We can not assume that a map pyramid, and above all, inconsistent with hierarchical relationships, it can be automatically acceptable, without subjecting the domain of knowledge to an attempt at critical analysis based on structural criteria of importance. The world is certainly a complex system where the criteria do not apply hierarchical and almost never the causal influences are rarely unidirectional. But, as Ausubel highlighted the way that the human mind learns that using it to sort and make sense of things, is to build hierarchical conceptual structures globally, characterized initially by a high level of instability and for to first stabilize and then grow.
Because most concept maps that we have done or are considered to be pyramidal, while those are very few loops, and unnecessary, as well as rare, sequential? It is tacitly imposed diffusion of a dominant model, or rather it is the mind that makes these structures more likely to emerge or "naturally"?
My working hypothesis is that a map cycle, or any other structure of representation is not predominantly hierarchical levels, may represent a useful attempt to always represent the " operation "of a system (such as" water cycle "), where a map pyramid would be absolutely ineffective. But the success of this effort is based on the existing conceptual mastery, those who build in the map, the concepts of the knowledge domain under study. This command, in turn, is based on a representative structure that is not present in the world, but that has been built according to the stadiums and the principle of progressive differentiation (by nature pyramid) indicated by Ausubel. The structures primarily affected by this epistemological approach typically "human", which comes mainly from the natural tendency for humans, to classify. Similarly, drawing from an epistemological framework established, including precise, well then shared generative links between scientific concepts, it will be possible to build models, descriptions or narratives about phenomena or portions of the world system, verifiable, falsifiable, capable of querying the system.
The structural map, like that which tells epistemology, the result of the individual or a community expert in time, however, are the testimonies of cognitive processes, such as layers of debris preserved many traces of past geological changes, and are needed for this pyramid. Although the maps do not pyramidal can represent processes, but of a type that occurs in the world, with the presumption of objectivity.
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